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CLD-113        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3979 
 ___________ 
 
 ARTHUR MILLARD, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
H.L. HUFFORD; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
 (D.C. Civil No. 3:10-cv-01593) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Edwin M. Kosik  
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
February 10, 2011 
 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:February 28, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Arthur Millard appeals from the District Court’s order denying his habeas petition 
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the following reasons, we will summarily affirm 
the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
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Millard, a federal prisoner, was charged with a disciplinary violation of possession 
of a weapon.  According to the officer who wrote the incident report, he found a 9.5 inch 
shank (a homemade knife) made of copper pipe in Millard’s cell inside a pair of socks in 
a mesh laundry bag sitting on top of Millard’s bed.  After a hearing, Millard was found 
guilty and sanctioned to sixty days of disciplinary segregation, a fifty-four-day 
disallowance of good conduct time, a 270-day forfeiture of non-vested good conduct 
time, a loss of telephone and visiting privileges for eighteen months, and a loss of 
commissary privileges for one year.  After challenging the sanction through the Bureau of 
Prison’s administrative process, Millard filed a § 2241 petition challenging the loss of 
good conduct time.  The District Court denied the petition, and Millard filed a timely 
notice of appeal.      
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2253(a).  We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and 
review its factual findings for clear error.  See Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 
(3d Cir. 2007).   
In his habeas petition, Millard argued that his disciplinary proceedings violated his 
due process rights because he did not have access to video footage of his cell that he 
wished to utilize to prepare for his hearing.  Millard, however, explicitly conceded in his 
reply brief that he had no viable due process claim.  To the extent that a due process 
claim may have survived Millard’s concession, the claim fails.  For substantially the 
reasons outlined by the District Court, the process provided to Millard in the disciplinary 
proceedings satisfied the requirements of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 
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(1974).    
The claims that Millard continues to pursue assert that Millard’s loss of good 
conduct time was unfair and unreasonable.  Millard argued that his punishment violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and also seems to argue a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.  The District 
Court did not frame the claims in terms of specific constitutional violations.  Instead, the 
District Court found that the sanctions “fall within the severity level set forth for the 
prohibited act,” and accordingly denied the habeas petition.  Because Millard’s claims 
lack merit, the District Court properly denied them.  
The Equal Protection Clause requires that all people similarly situated be treated 
alike.  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  To make 
out a successful claim, the petitioner must show purposeful discrimination that had a 
discriminatory effect on the petitioner.  See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 
(1987).  Millard cited various cases in which inmates received less severe punishment for 
the same violation committed by Millard (possession of a weapon), arguing that because 
he received harsher punishment than other inmates for the same offense, the punishment 
must have been the result of discrimination.  Beyond such an inference, however, Millard 
put forward no evidence that his punishment was the result of purposeful discrimination.  
Millard’s argument falls well short of establishing the purposeful discrimination 
necessary to make out an equal protection claim.  See id. (explaining that purposeful 
discrimination means “that the decisionmakers in [the claimant’s] case acted with 
discriminatory purpose”).  Accordingly, Millard’s equal protection claim lacks merit.     
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 Millard’s argument that the punishment imposed was unreasonable could also be 
construed as an Eighth Amendment claim challenging a punishment as “grossly 
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.”  Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271 
(1980).  To the extent that a loss of good conduct time could constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation, Millard’s punishment does not reach that level of severity.  
Although the fifty-four-day disallowance of good conduct time and 270-day forfeiture of 
non-vested good conduct time in Millard’s case was harsh punishment, it fell within the 
range of acceptable punishments outlined by the applicable regulations.  See 28 C.F.R.  
§ 541.13.
1
  Accordingly, the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment and was 
reasonable in light of the regulations guiding Discipline Hearing Officer punishment 
decisions.
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Based on the above, the District Court properly denied Millard’s habeas petition.  
Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.  
                                                 
1
 Although the regulations state that the Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”) will 
“ordinarily” disallow between 27-41 days of good conduct time, 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, 
Table 3(Greatest Category)(B.1), the regulations also permit the DHO “to go above the 
guideline range . . . for a greatly aggravated offense,” as long as the departure from the 
guideline range is “documented and justified in the DHO report.”  Id. at Table 4(1)(b.1).  
The DHO explained in his report that the sanctions were imposed because “[p]ossession 
of a weapon can lead to serious injury . . . and may escalate into a major confrontation 
between inmates and staff . . . .”  These are adequate reasons for imposing a harsher 
punishment than that recommended by the regulations’ guidelines.        
2
 To the extent that Millard challenges the constitutionally of 28 C.F.R. § 541.13 
in his brief in support of appeal, the claim was never raised below and is accordingly 
waived on appeal. 
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